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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jay Alton Roach appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate decision 
affirming the magistrate court's order excluding irrelevant expert opinion testimony from 
his trial for driving under the influence. On appeal, Roach contends that the exclusion 
of the expert's testimony deprived him of his constitutional rights. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The factual and procedural background of this case, as set forth by the district 
court, is as follows: 
On June 11, 2011, Jay Roach was arrested by Officer Neil Stevens 
for driving under the influence in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. 
Officer Stevens administered a breath alcohol test, which indicated Roach 
had a breath alcohol concentration of 0.143 and 0.144. 
On March 23, 2012, Roach filed Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's 
Request for Disclosure of Expert Witness Under Rule 16, disclosing Dr. 
Michael Hlastala as an expert witness. 
On March 27, 2012, the State filed an Objection to Defendant's 
Expert Witness Disclosure of Dr. Michael Hlastala and Motion to Exclude 
Expert Witness Under I.C.R. 16(c)(4) and 16(e)(2). 
On March 29, 2012, the State filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Expert Testimony. 
On March 30, 2012, Roach filed an Objection to Motion in Limine. 
Trial in this case began on March 30, 2012. After the selection of 
the jury and before the presentation of evidence, the State brought a 
Motion in Limine to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Michael Hlastala. 
At the hearing on the motion, Hlastala made a proffer of his testimony. 
The trial was continued pending the outcome of the Court's decision 
regarding Hlastala's testimony. 
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On April 13, 2012, the magistrate court entered Court's Order on 
Expert Testimony, excluding Hlastala's testimony. 
On June 21, 2012, the magistrate court entered an order certifying 
its April 13, 2012 Court's Order on Expert Testimony and granting Roach's 
motion for permissive appeal. 
(R., pp.165-66.) 
Roach appealed to the district court. 1 (R., pp.96-98.) After briefing by the parties 
(R., pp.116-61) and oral argument (R., p.163), the district court, acting in its 
intermediate appellate capacity, issued an opinion affirming the magistrate court (R., 
pp.165-77). Roach filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.179-80.) 
1 The state objected to Roach's notice of appeal and moved to dismiss it because an 
order excluding expert testimony is not a final order and Roach failed to move the 
district court for permission to appeal, as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 12. (R., 
pp.101-05.) Subsequently, the state withdrew the motion to dismiss and argued the 
appeal on its merits. (R., p.110.) Because the state withdrew the motion below, and 
because the failure to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 12 is not a jurisdictional defect, 
see I.A.R. 21, the state does not pursue this issue on appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Roach states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the trial Court error [sic] in its conclusion that the expert's 
testimony was only partition ratio testimony? 
2. Did the trial Court error [sic] in its conclusion that the expert's 
testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible? 
3. Was the exclusion of the expert witness a violation of the 
Defendant's Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to confront the 
evidence against him and to produce evidence in his favor? 
4. Was the exclusion of the expert witness contrary to Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 401 and 403? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Roach failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision affirming 
the magistrate court's order excluding irrelevant expert opinion testimony? 
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ARGUMENT 
Roach Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision Affirming 
The Magistrate's Order Excluding Irrelevant Expert Opinion Testimonv 
A. Introduction 
Below, Roach sought to present opinion testimony attacking the reliability of 
breath tests, generally, in determining if a person was intoxicated. (3/30/2012 Tr., p.32, 
L.5 - p.34, L.15.) The magistrate court correctly determined that, under State v. 
Hardesty, 136 Idaho 707, 39 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2002), such evidence was legally 
irrelevant and properly excluded the testimony. (R., pp.86-91.) Roach was granted a 
permissive appeal to the district court (R., pp.94-98), which affirmed the magistrate 
court (R., pp.165-77). 
On appeal to this Court, Roach asserts that the magistrate court erred by 
excluding the expert opinion testimony. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-21.) Roach's argument 
fails on two bases: First, Roach has failed to allege, must less show, error by the 
district court acting in its intermediate appellate capacity. Second, on the merits, Roach 
has failed to show an abuse of the magistrate court's discretion in excluding irrelevant 
opinion testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). ''This Court freely reviews the 
question of relevancy as an issue of law." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 
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P.3d 918, 921 (2010). Whether to admit expert testimony is discretionary and will not 
be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea, 119 
Idaho 352,806 P.2d 445 (1991). 
C. The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate Court's Proper Exclusion Of 
Irrelevant Expert Opinion Testimony 
This Court has clearly and repeatedly stated that it is the appellant's burden to 
demonstrate error on appeal. Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 
686, 689 (2004) ("Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is on 
the party alleging it." (quotations omitted)); Farrell v. Board of Com'rs, Lemhi County, 
138 Idaho 378,390,64 P.3d 304,316 (2002) (appellant carries burden of showing error 
on record and error never presumed); State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 
333, 334 (1996) (appellant has burden of showing error in record). Roach had the 
burden of demonstrating error by the district court. Far from showing error, Roach has 
failed to so much as allege error by the district court, but instead confines his argument 
to the decision of the magistrate court. Because Roach failed to even attempt to carry 
his burden of demonstrating error by the district court, the district court's appellate 
decision should be affirmed. 
Even if this Court construes Roach's attacks on the ruling of the magistrate court 
as an indirect claim of error by the district court, Roach's arguments still fail on the 
merits. Distilled, the issue raised by Roach is whether expert opinion testimony offered 
to attack the reliability of breath testing, generally, to determine a subject's level of 
intoxication is relevant following the amendment to Idaho Code § 18-8004 which made it 
a per se violation to have a breath alcohol concentration above the statutorily prescribed 
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limit. This issue was already decided by the Court of Appeals in Hardesty. In that case, 
the Court held that expert opinion testimony that a breath test could vary from a true 
measure of blood alcohol content was irrelevant because breath alcohol concentration 
above the prescribed limit is by itself a per se violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004, 
regardless of what the subject's "true" level of intoxication may be. Hardesty, 136 Idaho 
at 709, 39 P.3d at 649. 
The Court's holding in Hardesty is controlling. Roach's expert did not anticipate 
testifying that the machine inaccurately read the alcohol content of Roach's breath 
sample. (3/30/2012 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-15.) Rather, Roach sought to introduce expert 
opinion testimony that certain physiological variations in persons who are subjected to 
breath tests created inherent unreliability in a breath test's ability to truly measure 
intoxication. (3/30/2012 Tr., p.32, L.5 - p.34, L.11.) Such testimony, however, is 
irrelevant where the legislature has determined that a person with a breath alcohol 
concentration above the prescribed limit is per se intoxicated. Because the expert's 
opinion testimony was legally irrelevant, the magistrate court properly excluded it under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 402. The district court, therefore, correctly affirmed the 
magistrate court and should be affirmed. 
Roach presents on appeal essentially the same arguments he put before the 
district court. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp.5-21 with R., pp.5-19.) The district court 
specifically responded to each of these arguments in turn in its intermediate appellate 
decision. (See R., pp.167-77.) The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal the 
district court's analysis as set forth at pages 3-13 of its "Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Appeal," a copy of which is attached hereto as "Appendix A." 
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The opinion testimony Roach sought to introduce at trial was not relevant. The 
magistrate court properly excluded it and the district court correctly affirmed the 
magistrate court. Roach does not claim that the district court erred. The district court's 
intermediate appellate opinion should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's appellate 
decision affirming the magistrate's order to exclude irrelevant expert opinion testimony. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 2014. 
~~S~~~N-C-E-R~------
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of May, 2014, served two true and 
correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing the copies in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
RONALD L. SWAFFORD 
Swafford Law Office, Chartered 
525 Ninth Street 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404 
~~.~S-P-E-N-C-E-R-------­
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE ::1,'},:,~;) ',,_ 
" .:.;,:) /' ". , {., ~ J,..---
'-. .';:";. 
i: STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-2011-9167 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: APPEAL 
JA Y ALTON ROACH, 
Defendantl Appellant. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 11,2011, Jay Roach was arrested by Officer Neil Stevens for driving 
under the influence in violation ofIdaho Code § 18-8004. Officer Stevens administered a 
breath alcohol test, which indicated Roach had a breath alcohol concentration of 0.143 
and 0.144. 
On March 23, 2012, Roach filed Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Request for 
Disclosure of Expert Witness Under Rule 16, disclosing Dr. Michael Hlastala as an 
expeli witness. 
On March 27, 2012, the State filed an Objection to Defendant's Expert Witness 
Disclosure of Dr. Michael Hlastala and Motion to Exclude Expert Witness Under LC.R. 
16(c)(4) and 16(e)(2). 
On March 29, 2012, the State filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert 
Testimony. 
On March 30, 2012, Roach filed an Objection to Motion in Limine. 
Trial in this case began on March 30, 2012. After the selection of the jury and 
before the presentation of evidence, the State brought a Motion in Limine to exclude the 
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expert testimony of Dr. Michael Hlastala. At the hearing on the motion, Hlastala made a 
proffer of his testimony. The trial was continued pending the outcome of the Court's 
dec"ision regarding Hlastala's testimony. 
On April 13, 2012, the magistrate court entered COUlt's Order on Expert 
Testimony, excluding Hlastala's testimony. 
On June 21, 2012, the magistrate comt entered an order certifying its April 13, 
2012 Court's Order on Expert Testimony and granting Roach's motion for permissive 
appeal. 
On July 5, 2012, Roach filed a Notice of Appeal. 
Roach filed Appellant's Brief on February 1],2013. 
The State filed Respondent's Brief on March 11,2013. 
Roach filed Appellant's Reply Brief on April 1, 2013. 
Oral argument was held on April II, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
The district court must review a magistrate judge's decision on appeal upon the 
same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Rule 83(u), I.R.C.P.; Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 272, 611 P.2d 1055,1057 (1980). 
Although questions of admissibility of evidence often involve the exercise 
of the trial cOUlt's discretion, the tlueshold determination of whether the 
evidence offered is relevant presents an issue of law over which we 
exercise free review. Slate v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 134, 867 P.2d 
1006, 1008 (Ct.App.l994). 
Stale v. Hardesty, 136 Idaho 707, 708, 39 P.3d 647, 648 (Ct. App. 2002); accord Slate v. 
Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995) ("whether evidence is relevant is an 
issue of law"). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
Roach raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial COUlt erred in concluding 
the expert's testimony was pattition ratio testimony; (2) whether the trial court erred in 
concluding the expert testimony was irrelevant under Hardesty; (3) whether the exclusion 
violated Roach's Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to confront the evidence 
against him and to produce evidence in his favor; and (4) whether the exclusion of expert 
testimony was contrary to I.R.E. §§ 401 and 403. 
A. Partition Ratio Testimony 
Roach argues the magistrate court eITed in determining Hlastala's testimony 
would consist ofpartition ratio testimony. He notes that challenges based on partition 
ratios were eliminated when state Imv \vas amended to permit DUl charges based on 
breath test results vvithout any partition ratio comparison to blood alcohol levels. Roach 
argues that Hlastala's testimony addressed variations in breath sample analyses while 
excluding any discussion regarding the partition ratio. 
The State responds: 
Although he did not define "breath alcohol level" as it relates to a person, 
Dr. Hlastala opined that none of the breath testing instruments on the 
market accurately measured breath alcohol. R. at 85. This is because his 
opinions are based on comparison between breath alcohol testing and 
blood alcohol. For example, he said that human variability results in 
changes to the breath sample, which "in effect [makes] it less related to 
whaes in the human body." R. at 86. In light of his inability to define 
breath alcohol, one can only conclude that he's expressing that the breath 
sample becomes unrelated to the person's blood alcohol level. He also 
said that "breath testing instruments are biased against females because 
they have smaller lung volumes and that you would get for the same blood 
level, you would gel a higher breath level in a female because they have 
smaller lung volumes." R. at 87. 
Respondent's Br. at 9 (emphasis in original). 
In its Order on Expert Witness, the magistrate com1 stated: 
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While the Doctor indicated that he was not going to touch upon those 
issues precluded to him by Hardesty, it is clear that the challenge 
remained to essentially the same issues; to-wit: is breath testing a valid 
measure of intoxication? ... 
. . . Based upon Hardesty, the Court can conclude that the challenge while 
nol specifically related to partition ratio is a challenge to the under lying 
theory of breath testing and to the criteria that the legislature has adopted 
in order to determine impairment. 
Order on Expert Witness at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
The magistrate court did not, as Roach alleges, determine Hlastala's testimony 
would address partition ratios. Rather, the court recognized that Hlastala's testimony 
would challenge the validity of the underlying legislation in Idaho Code § 18-8004, 
thereby having a similar result as an attack on the partition ratio. The magistrate's 
conclusion was not in error. 
B. Rc]evuncc Under Hardesty 
Roach next argues the trial court erred in concluding the expert testimony was 
irrelevant under Hardesty. He argues Hardesty is distinguishable from this case because 
the court in Hardesty was addressing the use of expert testimony to attack breath tests 
based on the partition ratio. Roach explains: 
The Defendant in this case did not call Dr. Hlastala to testify either that 
individuals vary generally in their partition coefficient or that tlus specific 
partition ratio was below the norm. Rather, he called Dr. Hlastala to 
testify that the breath alcohol concentration taken from the sample of 
exhaled breath has proven to be an unreliable estimator of the alcohol 
concentration in the breath because, among other factors, none of that 
measurement derives from the alveolar sacs deep in the lungs and the 
measured air is highly affected by breathing patterns . 
. . . The testimony is a scientific challenge to the data obtained by breath 
test machines, before the partition ratio is applied to convert such breath 
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test data to blood-alcohol concentration by weight. 
Appellant's Br. at 14-15. Finally, "The testimony is a scientific challenge to the data 
obtained by breath test machines, before the partition ratio is applied to convelt such 
breath test data to blood-alcohol concentration by weight." lei. at 15. 
The State responds that: "Where the statute defines how breath alcohol is to be 
measured under the statute and the results meet the legal definition, testimony concerning 
a competing scientific definition is irrelevant under the principles of Hardesty." 
Respondent's Br. at 13. 
LR.E. 401 provides: "'Relevant Evidence'" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it 'would be without the evidence." 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 provides: 
(1) (a) It is unlavvful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, 
drugs andlor any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, 
as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual 
physical control of Ii motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a 
highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the 
public. 
(4) For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration shall be based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one 
hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (2 J 0) /ilers 
of breath or sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine 
or breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration shall be 
performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a 
laboratory approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of 
approval and celtification standards to be set by that department, or by any 
other method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for alcohol 
concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, certification or 
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quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by the 
Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state 
police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the 
necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing 
procedure for examination. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals has held that while challenges to the reliability and 
performance of a specific machine are valid, the "general admissibility of the breath 
analysis process has been too long established to be subjected to challenge now on the 
basis of its scientific acceptability." Stale v. Hartl-pig, 112 Idaho 370,375,732 P.2d 339, 
344 (Ct. App. 1987). 
In Hardesty, the defendant was arrested and charged with violating Idaho Code § 
18-8004( 1)( a) after a breath test indicated a .15 and .14 percent breath alcohol 
concentration. Prior to trial, Hardesty filed a motion to allow experi testimony 
concerning the unreliability and variability of the pa11ition ratio used to convert a 
person's breath alcohol concentration to a blood alcohol concentration. Hardesty made a 
vague offer of proof, arguing that variations in individual partition ratios render the 
standard petition ratio inaccurate. Without specifically addressing the issue of relevancy, 
the magistrate granted Hardesty's motion. On interlocutory appeal, the district court 
reversed the magistrate, holding that the expeli testimony was speculative and irrelevant. 
On appeal from the district court, the Court of Appeals limited the discussion to 
"the admissibility of evidence regarding the variability of the partition ratio among 
individuals." Jd. at 708, 39 P.3d at 648. The Court of Appeals explained the legislative 
history peliaining to breath and blood alcohol tests and the partition ratio as a means of 
converting breath alcohol concentration to blood alcohol concentration. Idaho ultimately 
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amended its DUl statutes so that when a breath analysis is administered to an individual 
suspected of driving under the influence, a determination of per se intoxication is made 
by measuring the breath alcohol concentration alone, without any determination of blood 
alcohol concentration. 
The court in Hardesty explained: 
Under the language of Idaho's amended DUI statute, therefore, a breath 
alcohol concentration above the proscribed limit of .08 percent is a per se 
violation of the statute regardless of blood alcohol content. Where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, (his Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutDlY cons/ruction. 
Stale v. Beard, l35 Idaho 641, 646, 22 PJd 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001). The 
language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning. ld Accordingly, conversion fro111 breath alcohol concentration 
to blood alcohol content is ullnecessary, and a person's blood alcohol 
content is no longer of sole legal consequence. Hardesty'S evidence 
regarding the variability of the standard patiition ratio is thus irrelevant. 
Under I.R.E. 402, evidence that is 110t relevant is 110t admissible. Other 
coulis interpreting DUI statutes that, like Idaho's, define driving under the 
influence in terms of a breath alcohol concentration in excess of the 
statutory limit have also held that evidence of the variability of the 2100: 1 
partition ratio is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. See Cooley v. 
Anchorage. 649 P.2d 251, 254 n. 6 (Alaska Ct.App.1982); Ireland, 39 
Cal.Rptr.2d at 876; Brayman, 751 P.2d at 298-99; J.'v1civianus, 447 N,W.2d 
at 657. 
Hardesty attempts to avoid this result by citing two Idaho cases, which he 
claims entitle him to challenge the partition ratio used by breath testing 
instruments. First, Hardesty cites Stale v. Hopkins. 113 Idaho 679, 747 
P.2d 88 (Ct.App.l987). In Hopkins, the defendant was charged with DUI 
after a breath test showed he had a blood alcohol concentration of .16 
percent. On appeal, the sole issue before this Court was whether the 
magistrate abused its discretion in refusing to accept a defense witness as a 
qualified expert on the Intoximeter 3000. This Court held that the 
reliability of the Intoximeter 3000 had been sufficiently recognized such 
that it was unnecessary for the state to introduce expeli testimony on the 
machine's design and methodology in order to establish a foundation for 
evidence of a blood alcohol concentration test result. However, in dicta, 
this Court stated that the unreliability of the scientific methodology 
underlying the design on the Il1toximeter 3000, as well as whether the 
paIiicular machine used to test the defendant's breath was functioning 
properly, were both challenges that could be maintained. This Court 
ultimately held that the witness was qualified as an expert and reversed the 
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magistrate's decision. 
Here, Hardesty's reliance on Hopkins for the proposItIOn that expert 
testimony regarding the variability of the partition ratio is admissible is 
misplaced. Under Hopkins, Hareles/y would be entitled to challenge the 
scientific methodology lInderlying Ihe design of the Intoxilyzer 5000 so far 
as it measured Hardesty's breath alcohol concentration. Therefore, as the 
district court concluded. Hardesty could challenge whether the Intoxilyzer 
5000 accurately measured his breath alcohol concentration at the time 
Hardesty's breath test was administered. In addition, Hardesty could 
challenge whether the patiicular instrument used to measure his breath 
alcohol concentration was working properly at the time of his breath test 
and whether his breath test was administered conectly. However, Hopkins 
does not stand for the broad proposition that Hardesty was entitled to 
challenge the accuracy of the standard partition ratio. 
Second, Hardesty cites State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 804 P.2d 936 
(Ct.App.1991). In Pressnall, the defendant was charged with DUI. At trial, 
the defendant testified that during a six-hour period, he consumed 
approximately seven beers and two shots of tequila. The defendant's 
breath alcohol content was measured by an Intoximeter 3000 
approximately five and one-half hours latcr and showed a breath alcohol 
content of .15 percent and .17 percent. The defendant's expert testified 
that, after drinking the amount of alcohol the defendant claimed to have 
consumed, a man of the defendant's height and weight would have had a 
blood alcohol content of between .05 percent and .09 percent. Through an 
offer of proof, the defendant indicated that his expeli would fmiher testify 
that the defendant's blood alcohol level was related to the alcohol content 
of his breath. The defendant sought to establish tlu'ollgh the expeli's 
testimony that that his alcohol content could not have been .10 percent or 
more, implying that the results of the Intoximeter 3000 were inaccurate. 
The district court ruled that any evidence concerning the defendant's blood 
alcohol content, or its relationship to the level of alcohol present in the 
defendant's breath, was irrelevant to the question of whether the 
defendant's breath alcohol content exceeded the statutory limit, and 
excluded the testimony. 
On appeal, this Court held that a defendant charged with DUl by proof of 
excessive alcohol contenl was entilled to offer any competent evidence 
tending 10 impeach the results of the evidenliCflJI tests admitted. Thus, this 
COUlt held that in a prosecution for DUI while having an alcohol content 
of .10 percent or more as shown by analysis of blood, breath or urine, 
evidence of a contradictory alcohol content, otherwise proper, was 
admissible for the purpose of impeaching the results of the evidentiCllY 
tests submitte'd by the state. The probative value of slich evidence was left 
10 the jlllY. This Court fmther held that once a breath test result had been 
admitted into evidence, the reliability and performance of the given 
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machine was subject to challenge and that the reliability of the process 
utilized may also be challenged. 
Here, Hardesty's application of Pressnall is overbroad. As the district 
court noted in its intermediate appellate decision, the defendant in 
Pressnall sought to impeach the accuracy of his specific breath test result 
with evidence that his own blood alcohol content was different than his 
breath alcohol content. The district court's ruling in this case also provides 
for such a challenge. Here, hO'wever, Hardesty also sought to introduce 
expert testimony regarding the inaccuracy of the standard partition ratio as 
it relates to some individuals. Like th.is Comi's holding in Hopkins, the 
holding in Press nail did not entitle Hardesty to maintain such a challenge 
through expert testimony.FN2 
FN2. We note that, although a person's blood alcohol content is 
irrelevant 10 whether there has been a violation of the prohibWon 
against driving with a breath alcohol concentration above .08 
found in l C. § 18-8004, Ollr holding does not preclude a person 
charged 'with DUIjrom introducing a contradicfOlY blood or urine 
alcohol concentration fest result taken at the time as impeachment 
towards the accuracy of his or her individual breath lest result. 
Thus, our holding in this case should not be read to be inconsistent 
with the holding in Pressnall in that regard. 
Hardesty1s argument is, in effect, a challenge fo the legislalllrelsformula 
for determining the proscribed alcohol concentration in a person's breath. 
Hardesty claims that this formula is a variation of the standard 2100: 1 
partition ratio used by breath testing devices and that he should not be 
prevented from introducing expert testimony regarding the variability of 
the standard partition ratio based on the statutory definition of driving 
under the influence. This is a challenge to what the legislature has 
determined to be an element of the crime of DUl It is uniformly held that 
the power to define crime andfix punishment rests with the legislature and 
that the legislature has great latitude in the exercise of thaI power. 
kJalloroy v. State, 91 Idaho 914, 915, 435 P.2d 254, 255 (1967); see also 
Slate v. Lesley, 133 Idaho 23, 26, 981 P.2d 748, 751 (CLApp.1999). We 
conclude, as did the district court, that allowing Hardesty's expert to 
testify regarding the variability of the standard partition ratio 'would be 
.5peculalive as it related to Hardesty. Thus, we hold that Hardesty's 
evidence challenging the accuracy of the standard pmiition ratio was 
inadmissible and, therefore, the magistrate erred. 
Under I.C. § 18-8004, Hardesty's proffered evidence of the variability of 
the standard 2100:1 partition ratio is irrelevant because a breath alcohol 
concentration above the prescribed limit of .08 percent is a per se violation 
of the statute regardless of blood alcohol content. Therefore, we hold that 
the magistrate erred by granting Hardesty's motion to introduce evidence 
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regarding the variability of the standard pm1ition ratio because such 
evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. The dish'ict COUlt's intermediate 
appellate decision reversing the magistrate's order is affirmed. 
Ie!. at 709-11, 39 P.3d at 649-51 (emphasis added). 
First, this Court agrees with the magistrate that although Hlastala was not 
testifYing regarding the partition ratio, his challenge to the scientific methodology 
underlying the breath alcohol test addresses essentially the same issue. I 
Second, the language of Idaho Code § 18-8004 is plain and unambiguous. If an 
individual has a breath alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher, as defined by section 18-
8004(4), that person is in violation of the law, regardless of what that individual's blood 
alcohol concentration is. 
Third, although Hlastala's testimony would have challenged the scientific 
methodology underlying the design of all breathalyzers, it did not specifically impeach 
the results of tests administered to Roach individually. Neither did Hlastala attack the 
reliability of the given machine. 
Like in Hardesty, Roach's argument is based on challenging "the legislature's 
formula for determining the proscribed alcohol concentration in a person's breath.» Id. at 
Theoretically, at least, where a statute defines a per se breath offense, it is 
not necessary even to allege that a given breath-alcohol level corresponds 
with any particular blood-alcohol level. In practice, however, the per se 
illegal breath-alcohol level adopted by these new statutes has been 0.1 
gram of alcohol per 210.0 liters of breath, or its equivalent, which is the 
same level that was previously used to prove a blood-alcohol percentage 
of 0.10 percent, based on the 2100 to 1 partition ratio. In effect, if one 
accepts the proposition that what is "really" being penalized is blood 
alcohol, this type of statute places the 2100 to 1 conversion ratio in the 
statute, rather than in the internal circuitry of the breath-testing machine. 
90 A.L.R. 4th 155, § 2[a] (notes omitted). 
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711, 39 P .3d at 651. Allowing Hlastala to testify regarding the variability of breath 
alcohol tests would be speculative as to Roach himself and not relevant to the question of 
'whether Roach's breath alcohol concentration exceeded the 0.08 limit established by 
Idaho Code § 18-8004. 
The magistrate court did not err in determining Hlastala's testimony was not 
relevant under Hardesty. 
C. 14th and 6 th Amendment Rights 
Roach argues that by excluding Hlastala's testimony, the court violated Roach's 
14th Amendment due process right to produce relevant evidence and to confront the 
evidence against him. Roach cites State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400,17 P.3d 901 (et. App. 
2001) in support of his argument. 
The State responds that Ward is inapposite to this case because it discusses 
challenges to the performance and reliability of a specific breath testing instrument, not 
the testing technique in general. 
In Ward, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
[O]nce the trial court has made the threshold determination of 
admissibility, a defendant is free to attack the reliability and accuracy of 
the admitted evidence tlu'ough the presentation of evidence at triaL See 
Stale v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 40, 764 P.2d 113, 117 (Ct.App. t 988). This 
evidence could include concessions elicited on cross-examination of the 
officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense expert. As 
stated previously by this Court: 
Obviously the reliability and performance of any given machine is 
subject to challenge. If there is evidence that any particular 
machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so as to 
produce unreliable results, sllch evidence would be relevant both to 
the admissibility and the weight of the test results. 
Stale v. Harnl'ig, 112 Idaho 370, 375,732 P.2d 339, 344 (Ct.App.l987). 
In addition, a party is free to challenge the officer's actions in observing 
the suspect for the requisite fifteen-minute period. See Stale v. Carson, 
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133 Idaho 451, 453, 988 P.2d 225,227 (Ct.App.1999). Thus, a trial couds 
"general admissibility of the results of [a breathalyzer test] in no way 
limits the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to 
the weight and credibility of such evidence." State v. Van Sickle, J 20 
Idaho 99, 104, n. 2, 813 P.2d 910, 915, n. 2 (CLApp.1991). The burden of 
persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the 
prosecution. ld. 
In the instant case, the controversy centers around the use and meaning of 
the terms "valid" and "validity." We note the considerable discussion 
between counsel for Ward and the magistrate in attempting to distinguish 
between "admissibility" and "validity." However, this confusion 
notwithstanding, the magistrate's ruling had the effect of preventing Ward 
from challenging the accuracy of the breathalyzer test, the weight to be 
afforded to the breathalyzer evidence, and the test's overall reliability. 
Although it is within the province of the trial court to determine the 
admissibility of evidence, it is the province of the jury to determine the 
weight, accuracy, and reliability to be afforded the evidence once it is 
admitted. The reliability both of the test's results and the process utilized 
to obtain the evidence are subject to attack. See Harhvig, 112 Idaho at 375, 
732 P.2d at 344. Therefore, having determined that the breathalyzer test 
was admissible, the magistrate erred in further ruling that Ward was 
prohibited from attacking the accuracy, weight, or reliabil1ty to be 
afforded to the test results at trial. 
lei. at 404-405, 17 P.3d at 905-906. 
Ward deals specifically with a defendant's right to attack the reliability and 
accuracy of an administered test. It does not discllss whether a defendant has the right to 
attack the scientific acceptability of breathalyzers generally. 
In comparison, in Hartwig, the Court of Appeals held that while challenges to the 
reliability and perforll1ance of a specific machine are valid, the "general admissibility of 
the breath analysis process has been too long established to be subjected to challenge now 
on the basis of its scientific acceptability." Stale v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 375, 732 
P.2d 339, 344 (CL App. 1987). 
The magistrate court did not violate Roach's 14th and 6th Amendment 
rights by excluding Hlastala's testimony. 
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D. LR.E. 401 and 403 
Roach argues that Hlastala's testimony was relevant regarding the accuracy and 
reliability of Intoxilyzer and the breath test. He adds that the testimony was not unduly 
prejudicial. 
As discussed above, under the Court of Appeal's holding in Hardesty, the 
scientific methodology behind breath alcohol tests is not relevant to a per se violation of 
the Idaho DUI statutes. Consequently, the magistrate COUli did not err in concluding 
Hlastala's testimony was not relevant. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The magistrate's decision to exclude Hlastala's testimony is affirmed. 
DATED this ~_ day of O::pC I l, 2013. 
\' ~~. 
Dlstnct Judge ~ 
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